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Abstract 
An often overlooked dimension of the EU's influence is the Europeanisation 
of Non-Member states. While Europeanisation in the case of member states and 
accession countries stems from the supranational influence of EU law and the 
increasing integration, EU influence in co-operation with third countries has been 
undertheorised. Drawing from insights of organisational sociology and neo-
institutionalist theory, the analysis of the organisational field of the external 
dimension of EU migration policy reveals interorganisational dynamics that are likely 
to impact on the policy output in non-Member States and shape Europeanisation 
processes.  
 
Complex interdependence leads to mutual influence whereby actors on all 
sides can impact on policy outputs. EU-influence is therefore dependent on 
the compatibility of understandings of migration and approaches as well as 
administrative capacities in the coordinating and implementing 
bodies. Rather than being dominated by EU actors, actors in third countries 
and implementation partners such as international organisations can be 
considerably empowered by Europeanisation. The process is hence not 
unidirectional but has multiple feed-back loops with considerable 
repercussions for policy output and process. This will be exemplified by 






European Union, Europeanisation, migration policy, Morocco, Ukraine, neo-
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1.0 Introduction 
This paper draws on insights of a PhD project under the same title. The overall 
objective is to explore the meaning of Europeanisation in the European Union’s (EU) 
cooperation with non-Member States (NMS) in implementing migration policy. Such 
an approach responds to queries that Europeanisation is “‘something to be 
explained’ not ‘something that explains’” (Radaelli, 2004: 2). Since the 
Europeanisation of NMS can hardly be analysed via macro-level analysis of bilateral 
relations, the focus will be set on the meso-level of governance networks within the 
policy field. Governance networks are centred on implementation of EU migration 
policy and consist of Commission Directorate Generals (DGs), EC Delegations, 
national Ministries and agencies as well as contracted international organisations 
(IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Europeanisation is hence the 
process which influences EU policy output via dynamics inherent in these networks. 
How can we make sense of interorganisational dynamics emerging during 
implementation and how do they influence EU policy output? What do we learn from 
these dynamics about the Europeanisation process in NMS?  
 
Based on a critique of functional-rationalist approaches to understanding 
governance networks, it is argued that sociological insights about path-dependence, 
isomorphism and organisational beliefs constitute helpful lenses to reveal and 
explain dynamics in implementing EU migration policy in NMS. Acknowledging 
complex interdependence between actors in these networks cautions towards top-
down understandings of implementation. These centre on questions of 
implementation ‘success’ or ‘failure’ following the perspective that decisions taken at 
an earlier stage are to be translated into action to fulfil those objectives (Pressman 
and Wildavsky, 1984, Gunn, 1978, Hill and Hupe, 2002: 41-51).  In contrast, 
implementation is understood here as a policy-action relationship. Following Barret 
and Fudge (1981: 4), implementation “needs to be regarded as a process of 
interaction and negotiation, taking place over time, between those seeking to put 
policy into effect and those upon whom action depends”. This approach has the 
advantage of seeing policy not as something set in stone once implementation starts 
but as the output of interorganisational interpretation and negotiation shaping policy 
all the way through the implementation process.    3
 
In order to delineate the research area, at least three meanings of the external 
dimension of EU migration policy can be distinguished:  
•  effects of EU internal policies on migration flows from NMS; 
•  effects of EU internal migration policy on NMS; 
•  effects of explicit external EU migration policy towards NMS. 
This research focuses on the last aspect because it provides us with the possibility 
to understand Europeanisation in clearly discernible policy projects and programmes 
that are meant to translate EU policy objectives into action. The focus is hence on 
policy output (i.e. interorganisational dynamics and project content) and not policy 
outcome (i.e. intended and unintended consequences on migratory flows and the 
like). EU policy interventions are analysed for Morocco and Ukraine. Both EU 
neighbours are policy targets as major countries of emigration and transit. Situated 
along an ‘old’ and a ‘new’ outer Schengen border along different migration systems, 
these cases can elucidate similarities or differences in the development of EU 
migration policy towards neighbouring countries. 
 
After elaborating on the concept of Europeanisation, the benefits of meso-level 
versus macro-level analysis open space for a governance perspective with is 
sensitive to sociological and historical neo-institutionalist insights and those from 
organisational sociology. The empirical analysis flags interorganisational dynamics 
in three salient areas of EU interventions in migration policy: border management, 
readmission and asylum.  
2.0 Europeanisation 
Although Europeanisation can occur via a number of processes in different settings 
(Olsen, 2002), most attention has been paid to accession countries and little to   
NMS (Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). The 
influence of European integration on domestic settings has been conceptualised as 
Europeanisation. Following Radaelli (2000: 4), “Europeanisation consists of 
processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and 
informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and 
shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy 
process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational)   4
discourse, political structures and public policies“. The Europeanisation literature has 
cautioned to take the policy type (“mode of governance” (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004) 
or “mechanism of Europeanisation” (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999)) into account which 
impacts on the way in which policy transfer is taking place. This top-down 
perspective has been challenged by the “goodness of fit”-approach (Börzel and 
Risse, 2000) which points out the influence of mediating factors of EU influence in 
domestic circumstances (such as veto points in institutional change, formal 
institutions and their resources, political and organisational cultures, changes in 
opportunity structures and the possibility of learning on interests and ideas of the 
actors involved (Cowles et al., 2001: 6-12)). Notwithstanding, Europeanisation is still 
often seen from a top-down perspective that tries to distil the strength of adaptational 
pressures on the domestic level. This reveals a gap for a bottom-up understanding 
of Europeanisation which can be complimented by the introduction of 
implementation and governance literature (Bache, 2003). This perspective sensitises 
towards the influence of manifold actors and interorganisational dynamics in 
governance networks shaping Europeanisation processes and policy output. 
 
Although Europeanisation of NMS implies convergence, it is a particular type of 
policy transfer (Bache and Jordan, 2006, Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, Lavenex and 
Uçarer, 2004). Even though EU actors are playing an important and often initiating 
role, EU influence does not implementation dynamics within governance networks. 
Instead of assuming principle-agent relationships in a hierarchical implementation 
chain, EU implementation partners and NMS authorities are not simply decision-
takers but shape policy output direct or indirectly via their actions. The following 
modifications to top-down Europeanisation approaches are necessary to 
accommodate for a dynamic and non-unidirectional understanding of implementation 
as a political process: 
•  non-EU specific influences on policy output 
•  interorganisational dynamics such as the role of privileged interlocutors like 
implementation partners and member states (MS) 
•  feed back loops that undermine the notion of the EU being the sole source of 
policy input 
•  domestic obstacles and sources of change with their influence on policy output.   5
This understanding of Europeanisation fits best within a meso-level analysis of 
governance networks.  
3.0 Macro- versus meso-level of analysis 
A governance perspective takes a meso-level approach to studying relations 
between EU actors and implementation partners in NMS. Attention is hereby on 
dynamics within the migration policy field and on potentially relevant actors within 
the NMS organisational context. Such an approach is questioning a macro-level 
perspective that assumes that the influence of EU migration policy on NMS mostly 
derives from power imbalances in terms of foreign and economic policy and the 
existence/absence of credible conditionality and incentives such as EU membership 
perspective (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, Missiroli, 2005). Following this 
perspective both Morocco and Ukraine would have good reasons to comply with EU 
wishes regarding migration policy.  
 
Morocco is in a unique geographical and political situation vis-à-vis Europe. It has 
been cut off from sub-Saharan Africa due to the Western Sahara conflict for more 
than three decades (Maghraoui, 2003, Souaré, 2007) and stays disconnected from 
the rest of the Maghreb due to the 1994 border closure with Algeria based on fears 
of Algerian terrorists, border demarcation disputes and Algerian support for 
Saharawi separatism (Vermeren, 2006: 36f, 92f). The Kingdom is not member of the 
African Union and neither membership of the Arab League nor Arab Maghreb 
considerably strengthen its international stance. This geopolitical environment 
means that Morocco’s most important partner is the EU and its Member States (as 
well as the USA) which are also its main trade partners. Despite Morocco’s rejected 
1987 EU member application, Morocco shares international trade and association 
agreements with the EU since the 1960s which recently culminated with the 2008 
“advanced status” agreement (EU and Morocco, 2008). 
 
Still hugely marked by fundamental transitions of the post-Soviet period since 
independence in 1990 (Kuzio, 1998), Ukraine can be still considered a “reluctant 
democratiser” (Kubicek, 2005: 271). The 2004 Orange Revolution triggered mostly 
an elitist coup with continuation of clique struggles, perceptions of political 
stagnation and even instability (Lane, 2008, Tudoroiu, 2007: 325-331). Despite   6
shared political support for European integration in Ukraine since the early 1990s 
(Derhachov, 2007, Wolczuk, 2006) and hopes that the 2004 events would overcome 
misunderstandings, frustration and fatigue in Euro-Ukrainian relations since 
independence, EU accession is as far as ever in 2008 (and NATO accession 
pigeonholed). At a joint summit, the EU let itself be carried away to “acknowledge 
the European aspirations of Ukraine and welcomes its European choice” (European 
Union and Ukraine, 2008). EU-Ukrainian relations are based on the 1994 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and are in process of renegotiation of a 
New Enhanced Agreement since 2007. The country is regionally split along political 
lines of strengthening relations with Russia or the EU (Zimmer and Haran, 2008: 
546f) and closer integration with both partners are seen as favourable by the 
majority of the population (Lane, 2008: 540) despite protracted tensions with Russia 
about gas transit and import, NATO membership and territorial disputes. Ukraine’s 
location in the EU’s and Russia’s shared sphere of interest could potentially allow it 
to extrapolate concessions from both sides and is therefore more beneficial than 
Morocco’s unilateral dependence. 
  
A macro-level perspective provides a useful contextual evaluation of bilateral 
relations which indicate the potential malleability of Morocco and Ukraine in the face 
of EU and MS policy interests and ideas. However, it obfuscates complex 
interdependence in the migration policy area and during implementation. The form of 
interaction and the types of actors in governance networks are likely to differ 
between policy fields leading to the influence of different norms, organisational 
beliefs and different forms of interdependence. This fits well with assessments that 
characterise the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as a “composite policy” in 
which sectoral dynamics are only loosely coupled to foreign policy objectives rather 
than amounting to a unified and coherent approach (Sedelmeier, 2002). Hence, 
actors from countries of origin and transit can be active shapers of migration policy 
(Brand, 2006) and not just EU decision-takers. Instead of assuming NMS as unified 
actors, a governance approach sensitises against assumptions of a central locus of 
power and opens way to neo-institutionalist insights, organisational sociology and 
implementation research. These point to the influence of implementers on the 
ground (Brunsson, 2000), the pressures and uncertainties they face and how they 
cope with these (Lipsky, 1971) as well as the influence of informal structured   7
relations outside of the formal interorganisational framework (Hjern and Porter, 
1981). “[Policy] is mediated by actors who may be operating with different 
assumptive worlds from those formulating the policy, and, inevitably, it undergoes 
interpretation and modification and, in some cases, subversion” (Barrett and Fudge, 
1981: 251). How can we account for organisational  behaviour in the inherently 
political process of implementation (Barrett, 2004: 253)? 
4.0 Analysing governance networks: a meso-level 
perspective 
In order to analyse interorganisational processes within governance networks, two 
competing strands of literature can be consulted: functional-rationalist as well as 
historical and sociological neo-institutionalist approaches. It is argued that the latter 
trump functional-rationalist approaches in explaining dynamics within governance 
networks and Europeanisation processes. 
4.1 A critique of functional-rationalist approaches 
Functional-rationalist accounts of networks centre on the idea that networks are 
based on resource interdependence. It is assumed that resource dependent 
relations in institutionalised interorganisational settings are based on norms of 
reciprocity which aim at indebtedness and entail economic considerations. Hereby it 
is the nature of the issue which shapes the emerging governance structures (Marin 
and Mayntz, 1991: 20). Lavenex (2008: 10) elaborates for external governance 
structures in the ENP that a particular choice of institutional arrangement mirrors 
enforcement problems and distributive effects of cooperation within a given area. 
Such accounts can lead to an overly narrow understanding of resources which 
should also include symbolic factors such as legitimacy and organisational beliefs 
and may ignore the potential for normative conflict between actors. 
 
Functional-rationalist accounts on the origin of cooperative structures are built on the 
assumption of hierarchical and non-conflicting preference structures, perfect 
information in institutional settings, the weighing of pros and cons and decision-
taking based on optimal expected outcome (Haas, 1982: 212f). This makes 
assumptions about rationality which do not match empirical observations that 
organisations may actually be rational by not following such ‘rationalist’ forms of   8
decision-making and action (Brunsson, 2000). Functional-rationalist approaches 
have therefore been questioned by theorists and empirical analysts for being 
ahistorical and ignoring sociological influences in the life of an organisation (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996). 
 
While it seems reasonable to assume functionality as one source of influence on a 
developing governance structure, it is by far not the only influence. Functional 
accounts assume the creation of the most effective structure in order to achieve a 
preferred output in the most efficient way of resource allocation. However, such 
theorising has the shortcoming that it cannot explain arrangements within an 
organisational field burdened by previous institutional relations and considerations 
than by the imminent will to contribute to a favoured output (Pierson, 2000, Powell 
and DiMaggio, 1991, Brunsson, 1989). This means that there are not only 
exogeneous factors of functionality and interdependence stemming from the policy 
object which influence the emerging structures (Marin and Mayntz, 1991: 18) but 
also endogeneous factors like already established interorganisational relations, 
‘ways of seeing’ and ‘ways of doing’ (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999, Pierson, 2000, 
Berger, 1977). These insights have been supported by empirical research on peace-
keeping forces and international regimes (Lipson, 2001), on IOs in the economic, 
political and human rights spheres (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004) and on the 
educational sector (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Hence, organisational structures need 
unpacking to reveal underlying dynamics of inclusion and exclusion of actors from 
governance structures and subsequent dynamics therein. 
4.2 Historical and sociological institutionalist insights 
Based on the above critique of functional-rationalist approaches, it is suggested that 
path-dependence, isomorphism and organisational belief systems are likely to 
impact on the dynamics in interorganisational networks. 
 
Standard operating procedures and previous organisational arrangements within the 
organisational field (IOs, MS, EU and NMS) are likely to impact on actor composition 
and practices within emerging governance network of EU external migration policy. 
Once organisations have established standard operating procedures that include 
particular forms of interactions and relations with other organisations, then it is   9
unlikely that these forms will be changed easily without considerable cost, rather 
incrementally and maybe rather by profound crisis. Path dependence therefore 
restrains the spectrum of policy alternatives via established (and possibly self-
reinforcing) organisational perspectives making the establishment of new 
interorganisational relations potentially less functional and relatively more 
troublesome than to maintain already existing relations with other organisations 
(Pierson, 2004). Path dependent power relations can therefore be ‘imported’ into 
governance networks and hamper functionality. Path dependence has been 
empirically observed in the ENP (Kelley, 2006, Bicchi, 2006, Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig, 2006) and may also likely to be found in the external dimension of 
EU migration policy. 
 
EU attempts to cooperate with NMS on migration are relatively recent and largely 
based on the European Council Conclusions of Tampere (CEU, 1999b). NMS along 
the EU’s outer border may not have had previous internal organisational 
arrangements on migration, external obligations stemming from international law or 
interorganisational relations prior to EU engagement. Under these circumstances, 
migration policy could be a new issue for these countries. The combination of these 
two factors leads to an opposing assumption to path dependence. The degree of 
institutionalisation of governance networks in the external dimension of EU migration 
policy may be relatively low. This means that network structures may still be quite 
malleable, actor composition unsettled and an experimental air about their 
approaches. 
 
Isomorphism is the phenomenon whereby similar environmental conditions restrain 
developmental possibilities of organisations and bring about similar organisational 
structures. Isomorphism can be based on coercive pressure, particular norms that 
establish ‘ways of doing things’ and the copying of organisational setups and 
approaches of organisations that are seen as successful (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). 
 
In order for organisations to understand their environment, they need to enquire and 
obtain information about it. What they do not know is whether the information is 
actually providing them with the answer that explains to them the complexity of   10
social reality nor whether the original question was actually adequate in the first 
place. Even if organisations obtained ‘good’ information, how would they know that it 
is the answer and would they have the capacities to make sense of it? Underlying 
these observations and rhetorical questions is the understanding that organisational 
‘sensemaking’ is a “symbolic process through which reality is created and sustained” 
(Weick, 2001: 11). Sensemaking is particularly important in interorganisational 
environments as organisational action is carefully scrutinised by other organisations 
and the public and is therefore not easily undone in its consequences, i.e. 
organisations need to justify their actions (Weick, 2001: 7, Brunsson, 1989). 
Organisations need to relate past decisions and actions to their original statute or to 
previous interpretations and at least symbolically justify their position to their 
environment even if this is achieved by means of ‘decoupling’ from their daily 
practices (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
 
Empirical research has confirmed the importance of belief systems in complex 
interorganisational settings. Students of these phenomena within MS and the 
European Commission have identified the impact of “administrative cultures” as the 
“institutional subconscious” (Cini, 1997: 88), of the “identity” of an organisation 
(McDonald, 1997: 51) and the “political and organisational cultures” (Cowles et al., 
2001: 10) on how they relate to other organisations. If these factors exert an 
influence within an organisational framework such as Commission, they are also 
likely to exert influence in cross-boundary cooperation with actors that can be 
assumed to introduce an even broader range of interests and ideas into the 
governance structure. There are indications that organisational “identities” and belief 
systems are influenced by administrative capacity, competence in the policy process, 
size of budget, political support for its subject area and frequency of relations with 
other organisations (McDonald, 1997: 51).  
 
In how far do macro-level relations account for EU policy output in NMS? What is the 
influence of path-dependence, isomorphism and organisational belief systems on 
policy interventions on migration? The following empirical insights from cooperation 
with Morocco and Ukraine are based on 62 semi-structured interviews with EU 
organisations, IOs, NGOs and governmental actors of MS and NMS in Brussels, 
Morocco and Ukraine between December 2007 and December 2008. Document   11
                                           
analysis of EU regulations, policy documents, speeches, etc. was furthermore used 
to substantiate the understanding of governance networks. 
5.0 Empirical analysis 
EU interventions in Morocco and Ukraine are not taking place in nothingness but 
require engagement with existing organisational structures and approaches. 
Following from the theoretical and conceptual considerations, any analysis of EU 
interventions has to consider politico-administrative systems, prior 
interorganisational relations and organisational belief systems which will be fed into 
the discussion where suitable. The present analysis is limited to three cooperation 
areas of migration policy which constitute EU priorities for both countries (CEU, 
1999a, CEC, 2001, CEC, 2005b, CEC, 2005d), namely border management, 
readmission and to a lesser extent asylum.
1 While the first two areas clearly reflect 
EU and MS interests in dealing with the regulation of peoples’ movements across 
the EU outer border, the asylum area is of interest because international law under 
the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol obliges Morocco and Ukraine as 
signatories to provide protection to refugees and asylum seekers and EU influence 
is largely channelled through cooperation with and funding of UNHCR whose 
interests and ideas both overlap and conflict with EU priorities.  
5.1 Border management 
International migration is characterised by crossing state borders for the purpose of 
at least temporary settlement. Controlling the movement of people across borders 
constitutes therefore an obvious means of state regulation of international migration. 
EU-interventions on border management aim at influencing central and exclusive 
activities of sovereign states like Morocco and Ukraine. 
5.1.1 Morocco 
The Moroccan case shows the necessity of prior consent of central political actors 
such as King and Interior Ministry for EU cooperation. Cooperation was largely 
dependent on Spanish-Moroccan relations. Spain is Morocco’s privileged partner 
 
1  EU cooperation also exists on fighting combating trafficking in human beings, migration and 
development as well as labour migration – the former for Ukraine and the latter two in experimental 
stages in Morocco. While cooperation with Morocco started already in 2001, projects in Ukraine were 
only financed from 2003 onwards, are less experimental and more limited in scope.   12
over the EU which could not force its conditions onto Morocco despite its macro-
level dominance. Quite the contrary, the EU-project conditions followed Morocco’s 
ideas and interests and reinforced the position of the Interior Ministry as the 
historically central actor in the organisational framework in Morocco forcing the EU to 
compromise part of its objectives and increase funding in order to achieve 
cooperation. 
 
Due to Morocco’s geographical proximity to Spain, illegal migration has been an 
issue of bilateral relations since the 1990s. In the context of Spanish boundary build-
up in compliance with Schengen requirements for internal free movement, visas 
were introduced for Moroccan citizens in 1991, the SIVE surveillance system 
gradually installed along the Spanish coastline, border fortifications erected and 
controls strengthened. Although most Moroccan irregular migrants entered Spain via 
regular ports of entry (Ortuño, 2005: 4, Khachani, 2003: 3), the issue of Moroccan 
border management became a principal concern for Spain. As can be seen in 
Spanish officials drafting the 1999 High Level Working Group action plan for 
Morocco, Spain is the principal interlocutor of Moroccan immigration issues at EU 
level.   
 
During the Aznar government (1996-2004), Spanish-Moroccan relations were 
marked by tension also in the area of migration. Spain attested lacking Moroccan 
cooperation because Morocco opposed the idea of becoming the “Gendarme of 
Europe” (Belguendouz, 2002) despite the incentive of a bilateral labour agreement in 
2001. The Aznar government had already asked for EU-sanctions against Morocco 
in 2001 and used its EU-presidency to increase the pressure via the Seville 
European Council Conclusions of 2002 (CEU, 2002: 10f). Simultaneous to the 
mounting European pressure, Moroccan civil society and the media brought the 
issue of drowned Moroccan citizens from sunken pateras to public attention. The 
decisive step to establish cooperation on border management via royal instructions 
by King Mohamed VI have therefore been interpreted as the result of EU pressure, 
reconciliatory steps towards Spain and internal public indignation (Interviews EC 
Delegation1; Moroccan Policy Specialist; NGO1). The royal instructions led to the 
creation of a specialised department within the Interior Ministry, Law 02/03 which 
sanctions facilitating networks and attempts of irregular migration and cooperation   13
with Spain on border controls and via interministerial meetings. This commitment 
was rewarded by a €390million Spanish economic investment package (Cassarino, 
2004: 31). Cooperation has further eased and expanded under the Zapatero 
government since 2004: border patrols are coordinated; the Royal Gendarmerie and 
the Air Forces exchange information and train with Spanish troops; Moroccan agents 
are associated with the SIVE teams and Spanish border guards have been observed 
in Moroccan ports in the Western Sahara (Interviews Moroccan Foreign Ministry, 
Spanish Embassy in Morocco, Moroccan Policy specialist, Elmadmad, 2007: 29).  
 
First plans to run an EU-project on border management in Morocco originated in 
informal discussions in 1998 and figured in the National Indicative Programme 2002-
2003 (CEC, 2001: 45f, Khachani, 2008: 13). Its allocated budget of €40million was a 
substantial response to the Council’s Tampere Conclusions to step up cooperation 
with NMS. The Commission planned implementation for 2003 but no progress was 
made until the royal discourse which encouraged the Commission to reiterate its 
cooperation offer. The project was agreed with the Moroccan authorities in 2004 and 
intended to provide mobile detection units and training for the Interior Ministry in 
cooperation with Spain and France (Interview EC Delegation1). However, the 
original project never materialised. Allegedly the Moroccan Interior Ministry wanted 
to use the money following its own priorities which raised fears of a politically 
contentious increase of Moroccan troops in the Western Sahara (Interviews 
Commission DGs RELEX1 and JLS1). Whether the Commission or the Interior 
Ministry halted the project is unclear but the controversial issues were monitoring 
and control over the project. 
 
Despite a small EU-twinning exercise (CEC, 2005c) and Spanish cooperation with 
Morocco and Mauritania under the AENEAS project “Sea Horse” on the fight against 
illegal migration (Guardia Civil, n.d.), the MEDA border management project only 
regained momentum after the dramatic events of Ceuta and Melilla in autumn 2005. 
Part of the outcome of the Commission’s technical mission to Spain and Morocco 
(CEC, 2005e) was to transform the MEDA-project by increasing the original budget 
and employing a sector approach. This allowed the Interior Ministry to use €67million 
EU-funding following its own priorities, on any border section and apparently without 
close monitoring (Interviews DG RELEX1 and EC Delegation1). With the project, the   14
Commission aimed at supporting Morocco to develop a “migration strategy” by 
building-up the Interior Ministry’s new department and installing a migration 
observatory for interorganisational coordination and inclusion of other Moroccan 
Ministries and agencies with a less securitised vision of migration than the Interior 
Ministry (Interview EC Delegation1, CEC, 2006a: 10). Project implementation is still 
ongoing but the Commission has already expressed satisfaction with the project 
output. However, if the Commission wanted to broaden Moroccan organisational 
perspectives on migration through this project, then its objective failed: the migration 
observatory has never come to life despite the stated interest of other Moroccan 
actors (Interviews Foreign Ministry, Labour Ministry). Maybe more importantly, the 
considerable EU-funding has strengthened the central position of the Interior 
Ministry therefore re-emphasising its securitised vision of migration in the 
governance network. This means that the EU made both far-reaching financial and 
operational concessions and sacrificed the idea of an integrated perspective on 
migration issues in order to achieve cooperation on border management.  
5.1.2 Ukraine 
The Ukrainian case needs to be viewed in the context of state-building. Ukraine has 
no tangible future of EU accession but shows political commitment to reform. 
Concerning border management, reform is however largely self-motivated by 
Ukrainian State Border Guard Service (SBGS) as the main beneficiary of EU funding. 
Although SBGS managed to influence project objectives, problems of insufficient 
funding, corruption and border demarcation persist as expressions of Ukraine’s 
transition experience. 
 
When Ukraine abolished Soviet mobility restrictions and granted visa free entry to 
citizens of former Soviet republics and of some African and Southeast Asian 
countries, more than 2000km of Ukraine’s border were undemarcated and 
unguarded towards Russia, Moldova and Belarus (ICPS, 2006). With the collapse of 
state industry and collective farms, rising unemployment, worsening social services 
and public administration, internal migration and emigration increased substantially 
(Korobkov, 2007). In 2007, the Ukrainian Minister of Economy Kinakh estimated that 
four to seven million Ukrainians were living abroad (Söderköping Process, 2007a), 
most of whom illegally either in EU-countries or Russia. Border apprehensions of   15
irregular migrants furthermore confirm that Ukraine has become a transit country 
(ICMPD, 2005: 227-232) which hosts around half a million legal and illegal migrants 
(Interview SCNR). The 2004 EU enlargement of Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries and their 2007 accession to the Schengen area put EU-Ukrainian 
cooperation on border management onto the agenda. 
 
Similar to EU programmes in the pre-accession process, cross border and regional 
cooperation programmes were established including Ukraine since 1997. These 
were continued in consecutive years and border management explicitly introduced 
into EU-Ukrainian cooperation since 2001. Their focus have been on infrastructure, 
equipment and staff training of border guards and customs services in order to 
facilitate and control the cross-border flow of goods and people (CEC, 2006b).  
 
The main EU implementation partner for border management in the governance 
network is SBGS. A Presidential decree in 2000 initiated its reform from a military 
organisation to a law enforcement agency. Prior to EU-assisted reform, it exclusively 
focused on securing the borderline against invaders without investigative powers 
within Ukraine and partially recruited conscripts. Rather than simply being compelled 
to cooperate, SBGS had clear interests in the reform process (Interviews SGBS, EC 
Delegation2): 
•  Constitutional provisions prohibit military services to limit the freedom of 
civilians.  
•  Failure to reform would have banned SGBS from interacting with civilians and 
undermined its central tasks. 
•  Reform allowed its expansion into investigating cross-border criminal activities. 
•  Contact with other border guard services over the 1990s and early 2000s 
made SGBS aware of its archaic structure and limited capacities awaking the 
desire to match their Western counterparts and increase professionalism. 
Although EU cooperation is dependent on Ukraine’s wish to go down the road of 
European integration (wherever it will take it), the above mentioned factors are 
important because they create ownership of SBGS in the EU assisted reform 
process. SGBS is autonomous and not subservient to particular ministries. In 
contrast to frequent changes of incumbents of most senior governmental and 
administrative positions in Ukraine, SBGS leadership has not changed since 2002.   16
                                           
Continuity of leadership and autonomy have greatly facilitated cooperation from an 
EU perspective (Interview EC Delegation2).  
 
SBGS became beneficiary of a €10million TACIS-project under the sector approach 
(2006-2008). Since SBGS had little funds for equipment, EU aid has been 
concentrating on infrastructure and technical equipment. Following SBGS 
development concept to become “Schengen-compatible” until 2015 (SBGS, 2007b), 
the project also provided staff training with MS support. Since 2008, SBGS ceased 
conscriptions and is now officially a civilian body although still responsible for border 
defence. 
 
In contrast to the Moroccan MEDA-border management project, benchmarking 
allowed for monitoring and project evaluation via the JHA scoreboard with Ukraine. 
EU conditionality is however limited to breaking off project commitments. The 
importance of the bilateral political climate for project implementation is reflected in 
the Commission’s project risk assessment about the detrimental effect of a possibly 
Eurosceptic outcome of the 2006 parliamentary elections (CEC, 2006b: 8).  
 
SBGS’s organisational expansion was not uncontested by the Interior Ministry 
because SBGS transformation into a law enforcement agency limited its powers. 
This conflict produced an impracticable split of tasks
2 which resulted in apprehended 
illegal migrants staying beyond the legal limit in overcrowded detention centres 
which are furthermore highly underfinanced because neither the security services 
nor the SBGS feel responsible nor want to make funding available (Interview IOM1, 
CEC, 2007). This indicates that autonomy although conducive to implementation is 
also problematic to policy output if it leads to coordination problems. 
 
SBGS also benefited from other projects financed by the US and/or EU (SBGS, 
2007a). While US-funding has largely focused on fighting the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, EU projects largely overlap with the 2006 TACIS-
project and often use IOs as intermediary implementation partners. IOM managed 
the EU-funded HUREMAS I+II projects (Reinforcing SBGS Human Resources 
Management System, 2006-2009) (IOM, 2008). OECD is running a small risk 
 
2 SBGS is allowed to investigate for 10 days before the matter is passed on to the security services.   17
analysis project for SBGS and ICMPD concentrates on document security and 
exchanging know-how on asylum, visas, and border control via bilateral networking 
with MS. The most sizeable EU-programme is EUBAM (European Border Assistance 
Mission to Moldova and Ukraine, 2005-2009) with a budget of €44million which was 
launched upon request of both countries and is administrated by UNDP. EUBAM is 
an advisory and technical body drawing on MS expertise which aims at enhancing 
capacities and cross-border cooperation of SBGS with their Moldovan counterparts. 
It focuses largely on one third of the Ukrainian-Moldovan border which is under 
control of the de facto autonomous Transnistria (and hence uncontrolled by 
Moldova). The objective goes beyond mere institutional capacity building but has 
clear foreign policy objectives “to seek a solution to the conflict in Transnistria” 
(UNDP, 2007) and to control weapon trafficking, ammunition storage and arms 
manufacturing plants (CEC, 2006c). 
 
The EUBAM example raises the question of Ukrainian influence on EU project 
contents and geographical focus. Apart from its concerns about Transnistria, EU 
interest focuses on its shared border with Ukraine. Especially the Slovakian border 
segment in the Carpathian Mountains is hard to control and Ukrainian emigration 
has furthermore stemmed largely from western impoverished areas with traditionally 
close cross-border links. While the eight 2004 post-accession countries received 
€860million EU-funding for border management for 4278km of EU outer borders 
between 2004-2006, Ukraine (with 4673km of land borders) received only 
€258million in total. The one-sided EU emphasis on Schengen borders is 
problematic for Ukraine because of its unmarked borders. In 1997, Ukraine signed a 
bilateral border demarcation treaty which Belarus failed to ratify. Border demarcation 
with Russia is contentious due to territorial questions in the Azov Sea (Söderköping 
Process, 2007b) and to Ukraine’s split over its relations with its eastern neighbour. 
This scenario poses problems for border controls because intercepted criminal 
networks and individuals can claim not to know the respective state territory. 
Unilateral attempts at boundary fortification furthermore cause indignation by citizens 
living on both sides of the border and triggered Russian public statements of a split 
between brother nations (Interview SBGS, Jamestown Foundation, 2002).   
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EU border control enforcement along Ukraine’s western border in contrast to its 
transparent northern and eastern borders makes Ukraine an open receptacle for 
immigration and transit migration. SBGS argued that concentrating on the western 
border is largely superfluous due to strong EU border surveillance and managed to 
convince the Commission to invest funding also in equipment at other border 
segments (Interviews EC Delegation2, SBGS). There is also incongruence between 
EU funding for the fight against illegal migration from Ukraine and SGBS’ vision of 
Ukrainian migration. A high ex-official stated: “From the viewpoint of the SBGS, they 
are not illegal immigrants but legal emigrants – they are just citizens crossing the 
border” (Interview SBGS). Although SBGS seems to have adopted threat 
perceptions of irregular immigration and trafficking in human beings, on the ground 
synergistic effects exist. Corruption among border guards has been endemic in 
Ukraine (as in other areas of public life) with facilitating effects on organised crime, 
illegal migration, weapons and drug trafficking (Interviews SBGS, Buzalka and Benč, 
2007).  
5.2 Readmission 
Once people are found to have illegally crossed an international border without legal 
documentation or outside of regular ports of entry, EU countries have been 
interested in establishing readmission with countries of origin and transit. EU-
readmission agreements aim at imposing the reception of forced returnees (citizens 
and non-citizens) on non-Member States. This clear-cut objective is especially 
salient for emigration and more recently immigration and transit countries like 
Ukraine and Morocco. While direct readmission at the border between border guard 
services seems to be common practise (Interview DG JLS2)
3, formal agreements 
including the readmission of third country nationals (TCN) have been contentious. 
5.2.1 Morocco 
Morocco has managed to fend off the conclusion of an EU-readmission agreement 
since 2000 despite its macro-level dependence. This unsuccessful attempt at 
Europeanisation has feedback effects at EU level and undermines the Commission’s 
 
3 For example, two to three readmissions to Morocco occur daily at ports of entry in Spain without any 
formalities (HRW, 2008: 9).   19
                                           
position towards MS. The latter have been more successful with bilateral 
agreements but Morocco used implementation to limit their effects.  
 
Signing a readmission agreement has been the most contested issue at the political 
level between Morocco and the EU (Interview EC Delegation3). Now in their twelfth 
round, negotiations have been stuck due to “technical points” (CEC, 2006a: 10). 
Although Morocco is willing to take back its own nationals, TCN readmissions are 
contested (Interviews DG JLS3, Spanish Permanent Representation, Moroccan 
Foreign Ministry). Given that the EU is not planning on signing further readmission 
agreements concerning TCNs apart from currently negotiated cases (Interview DG 
JLS2), this compels Morocco to sign readmission agreements with sub-Saharan 
countries raising the danger of chain-refoulement plus endangering Morocco’s 
relations with these countries due to the Western Sahara question. The solution to 
Morocco’s dilemma is unclear but Morocco seems eventually to give in. While a 
solution was found concerning TCN identification, Morocco wants a token for its 
signature like visa facilitation or a mobility partnership with emphasis on labour 
market access quotas and circular migration (Interviews DG JLS3, Moroccan 
Foreign Ministry, EC Delegation3). However, the Commission does not have a 
Council mandate to negotiate these issues with Morocco in comparison to 
negotiations with other countries. The exclusive Commission mandate on bilateral 
readmission negotiations with NMS which prohibit MS from parallel negotiations, 
informalised agreements by MS have been observed allowing for flexibility and 
operability (Cassarino, 2007). This tendency exerts pressure on the Commission 
and undermines its status.
4 The Commission’s restricted mandate and lacking 
coordination between DGs limit incentives and leverage on Morocco in readmission 
negotiations (Interviews DG RELEX1, JLS3). Despite ulterior motives, bilateral 
negotiations on the Advanced Status agreement with Morocco did not spark 
Moroccan cooperation on readmission (Interview EC Delegation3).    
 
However, the apparent success of MS to sign readmission (or related) agreements 
with Morocco should not overshadow that Morocco hampers their implementation. 
While readmission of Moroccan citizens seems to follow the agreement, the 
admission of sub-Saharan migrants is often contested on grounds of lacking proof of 
 
4 Both Spain (in 2003, 2007) and France (in 2001) have signed such agreements with Morocco.   20
transit via Morocco avoiding readmission without overtly breaching the agreement 
(Carling, 2007: 323). These implementation gaps are also supported by pressure 
from national and international NGOs which are strongly opposed to the readmission 
of nationals and particularly TCN on grounds of insufficient reception facilities and 
techniques or fundamental disagreement with selective border admissions. 
5.2.2 Ukraine 
“The EU migration policy approach to Ukraine is readmission” (Interview IOM2). On 
paper an EU-readmission agreement was easily achieved – implementation will 
prove to be more difficult if not costly for migrants’ human rights.  
 
Based on a Council mandate from 2002, Ukraine entered into negotiations on an EU 
readmission agreement in conjunction with a visa facilitation agreement (based on 
the Russian model) in November 2005. Negotiations with the Commission 
progressed quickly and led to signing both agreements in April 2007. Similar to the 
EU-Albanian agreement, a suspension clause gives Ukraine two years to implement 
necessary measures in preparation of readmission from 2010 onwards. To ensure 
implementation, conditionality is invoked by coupling the start of visa-facilitation and 
readmission (CEC, 2007: 20). Despite holding out the prospect of further visa 
liberalisation, conditionality is weak for two reasons: 1) Visa-facilitation is only 
benefiting a select elite. 2) Given that most Ukrainian citizens travelled to CEE 
countries, the requirements under the visa-facilitation agreement still provided worse 
conditions than before the 2007 Schengen enlargement (Boratyński et al., 2006). 
What explains Ukraine’s signature of the agreements?  
 
The ease with which the EU had achieved Ukraine’s cooperation on readmission 
after 2005 was based on “the particular historical moment” (Interview DG JLS1) 
because the post-Orange Revolution elite wanted to show commitment to cooperate 
with the EU after the Russian rapprochement in the last years of the Kuchma 
Presidency. The Commission was well aware of the difficulties that implementing the 
readmission agreement would cause and offered financial and technical assistance. 
However, it seemed clear that Ukraine would be left with returned TCN from 
countries with which Ukraine either did not have or could not achieve a readmission 
agreement of its own (namely China and Russia) (Interview DG JLS1). In fact, a   21
Russian-Ukrainian agreement has been signed in 2006 but not ratified by Russia. An 
additional difficulty is to prove the provenance of migrants as in the Moroccan case 
but also for Ukraine to provide the means for repatriation.  
 
Concerns about the number of future TCN readmissions from 2010 onwards run 
high in Ukraine although IOM considers them as exaggerated (Interviews Interior 
Ministry, IOM2). EU assistance came in the form of €30million to the Ukrainian 
Interior Ministry. Spending will be supervised by both sides and partially 
administered by IOM. EU concerns revolve particularly around current detention 
conditions for irregular migrants which have been in violation of human rights 
standards (Council of Europe, 2007: 31-39). The objectives are consequently the 
improvement and enlargement of detention facilities that comply with international 
standards, the provision of adequate legal, sanitary and living standards to 
detainees, funding for NGO support in the provision of services to returnees, staff 
training and financial support for further return to the country of origin (CEC, 2007: 
18f). Obstacles to speedy implementation involve corruption and consequent 
overspending as well as disputes over property rights and financing of facilities 
between the Ministries of Interior and Defence and SBGS. These disputes reflect the 
Ukrainian institutional fragmentation of the migration portfolio and the lack of 
coordination and a lead authority. Jealousies with staff can be also expected as 
funding only goes into holding facilities but not into staff facilities which are under the 
responsibilities of Ukrainian authorities (Interview IOM1). In addition, dangers to 
refugees and asylum seekers persist as the Ukrainian asylum process is inadequate. 
This is unlikely to be resolved until 2010 when the readmission agreement enters 
into effect. The agreement does not contain safe-guard clauses on asylum seekers 
and refugees and makes chain-refoulement likely (Interview UNHCR1). EU-funding 
will not resolve these issues. 
5.3 Asylum 
The asylum portfolio is peculiar because EU-funding supports NMS to fulfil their 
international obligations. Due Morocco’s and Ukraine’s reluctance and/or inability to 
effectively engage with asylum matters, EU cooperation with UNHCR as the central 
interlocutor is crucial for the governance network. In comparison with service-led   22
                                           
intergovernmental organisations such as ICMPD and IOM, UNHCR has a higher 
level of autonomy which can impact on EU ambitions. 
5.3.1 Morocco 
Morocco has been reluctant to engage with its obligations under the Geneva 
Convention. Hence UNHCR’s role has been crucial for asylum seekers and refugees. 
However, EU cooperation with UNHCR has not been void of coordination problems 
to the detriment of projects and the migrants themselves. Due to overlapping 
agendas between the two, UNHCR seemingly drives Morocco’s Europeanisation 
however based on its autonomy derived from international law and its experience. 
 
Since UNHCR started to recognise increasing numbers of refugees in the early 
2000s, Morocco officially closed its national asylum office in the Foreign Ministry in 
2004 and froze cooperation with UNHCR (Interviews Foreign Ministry, UNHCR2). 
Subsequent detention and expulsion of refugees and asylum seekers by Moroccan 
authorities (especially around the 2005 events of Ceuta and Melilla) led to UNHCR 
intervention via its headquarters and to EU and US pressure to stop expulsions and 
regularise UNHCR’s cooperation with Morocco. Contributing factors to Morocco 
signing an accord de siège with UNHCR in 2007 were UNHCR’s continuing practise 
to recognise refugees which left Morocco with little other option than to accept 
cooperation at least on a basic level, the suffering international image of the country 
and the gradual recognition of mixed migration flows by the Moroccan authorities 
(Interviews EC Delegation1, UNHCR2). UNHCR’s introduction of security documents 
for refugees facilitated Morocco’s decision to sign the accord de siège because it 
feared increasing numbers of irregular migrants ‘disguised’ as asylum seekers and 
refugees on forged documents (Interview Foreign Ministry).
5  
 
Although refugees do not have the right to state support or work permits in Morocco, 
access to local health centres has become common practise since 2008 and 
scholarisation in state schools is commencing (Interview UNHCR2, NGO2). The EU 
has engaged with the often precarious living conditions of asylum seekers and 
 
5 This fear is surprising given the low overall numbers. At the beginning of 2006 there were 2,129 
asylum applications to UNHCR, 1,578 in 2007 and only 369 until September 2008. The recognition 
rate between 2005 and 2008 was around 20 percent and until September 2008 there 877 refugees 
recognised by UNHCR in Morocco (numbers UNHCR Morocco).   23
refugees through AENEAS-funding. This boosted UNHCR’s annual budget of 
€1million by another €400,000 (2007-2009) and supported NGOs in providing 
assistance to sub-Saharan migrants. In fact, the arrival of EU-funding split the 
Moroccan NGO landscape over cooperation with UNHCR which was brandmarked 
as an EU agent and severely hampered it to find implementation partners 
(Interviews UNHCR2, NGO2, 3). Since EU-funding was running out in 2009, UNHCR 
missions in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia applied jointly for project continuation but 
no further EU-funding was granted. It seems that Brussels assumed the 2007 accord 
de siège resolved the problematic relationship with the Moroccan authorities 
although the EC Delegation in Rabat was aware of continuing difficulties for asylum 
seekers and refugees. This incoherent output prompted the comment: “Maybe we 
have become the victim of our own success” (Interview UNHCR2). Coordination 
issues between Rabat and Brussels and a lack of feedback and follow-up can hence 
seriously undermine EU objectives of approaching international asylum standards in 
Morocco.   
 
Since 2007, UNHCR politically propagates asylum as an essential part of a 
comprehensive Moroccan migration policy. The UNHCR representative stated, “We 
cannot open the asylum room without developing the other rooms otherwise all 
migrants flock into the asylum room” (Interview UNHCR2). Together with other UN 
organisations UNHCR drafted an asylum system but without any official reply to date. 
UNHCR and EU interests in a comprehensive migration system overlap. UNHCR 
lobbies for asylum capacity building with reference to Morocco’s international 
obligations and economic capacities as a middle-income country. This will eventually 
allow the EU to implement its ‘safe third country’ principle and reduce the intake of 
asylum seekers. Although this influence could be interpreted as Europeanisation of 
Morocco’s migration policy, the influence of UNHCR is based on its own 
organisational beliefs and practical considerations.  
5.3.2 Ukraine 
Although Ukrainian asylum legislation is largely deemed satisfactory despite its lack 
of subsidiary protection, implementation is insufficient (Interviews UNHCR1, EC 
Delegation3, SCNR). Hardly any state support is provided for asylum seekers and 
refugees based on the argument of lacking funding and comparable living conditions   24
of Ukrainian citizens. Although EU funding has concentrated on Ukraine’s asylum 
system (albeit comparatively lower than for border management and readmission), 
political instability, weak administrative capabilities and interagency competition 
have largely blocked effective procedures.  
 
Based on a Commission proposal and its Council approval in 2004, the Commission 
developed the Regional Protection Programme (RPP) to improve protection in 
countries of transit and origin. Conveniently this reduces the potential number of 
asylum seekers in the EU. This argument applies to the choice of the Western Newly 
Independent States (Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine) as a pilot which reflect “a clear 
priority in discussions with Member States … [and] a strong priority across 
Community external relations policy and financial assistance” (CEC, 2005a: 5). 
Although RPP concentrated €2million EU-funding in Ukraine (2005-2006) in form of 
four projects under AENEAS and TACIS funding, RPP’s greatest weakness is the 
deliberate decision not to provide additional funding, reducing possible initiatives 
elsewhere (Interviews UNHCR2, EC Delegation3).  
 
EU-funding on asylum directly assists migrants in reception and detention centres, 
allows networking and capacity building between NGOs as well as cooperation with 
state authorities and raising standards during the asylum process. Furthermore, the 
intergovernmental Söderköping process which aims at information exchange and 
best practise on asylum (and irregular migration) since 2001 was added into the 
RPP. Funding for these implementation partners was prolonged for other asylum 
projects under the 2007/08 funding cycle.  
 
The responsible state authority for asylum matters is the State Committee for 
Nationalities and Religion (SCNR) which is important but increasingly sidelined in 
the governance network. The body has been scarred by rapidly succeeding 
governments and subsequent changes of higher ranking staff. Constant 
restructuring have weakened SCNR and led to perverse effects (Interview SCNR). 
During the 2007 restructuring the term ‘migration’ was not only erased from its name 
but also from its mandate. Since this ‘accident’ eliminated the central decision-
making body for asylum cases, no asylum decisions were taken between March and 
November 2007 until SCNR statutes were altered (Interview UNHCR). SCNR   25
oversees 24 regional offices responsible for asylum interviews and 
recommendations. These correspond with administrative units but not with the 
respective regional caseload leaving some without work while others are swamped 
with cases. UNHCR suggested resource relocation which has been resisted until 
2008 (Interview UNHCR). At central as well as regional level, required staff 
qualifications are high but pay is low. Once capacity building projects have improved 
staff qualifications, personnel often move into higher paid jobs in the private sector. 
This phenomenon is also widely known in other areas of migration policy (Interviews 
UNHCR2, SCNR, EC Delegation3, ICMPD, IOM1) and often frustrates attempts at 
Europeanisation of practices.  
 
Interagency competition between SCRN and SBGS hinders migrants from handing 
in asylum applications but such competition is also known within SBGS (Council of 
Europe 2007: 39, Interview UNHCR2). Due to its weak capacities and uncertain 
future, SCNR seizes opportunities to increase its overall profile. An EU project 
introduced an NGO platform on asylum which was usurped by SCNR to the 
discontent of NGOs which felt subordinated and contradicted project intentions 
(Interviews NGO4, 5). Such attempts also reflect competition between SCNR and 
Interior Ministry (currently responsible for illegal migration) about the future 
distribution of the migration portfolio, SCNR’s possible dissolution and integration 
into the Ministry. It generally seems that the EU prefers cooperating with one central 
actor rather than a fragmented organisational field. SCNR’s weakened position has 
raised doubts at EC Delegation level whether supporting SCNR is worth while 
(Interview EC Delegation3). These doubts in connection with already existing EU 
support for the Interior Ministry and its preponderance in Ukraine’s migration policy 
shape EU preferences about the organisational layout in Ukraine. Hence EU 
preferences reflect functional concerns about implementation rather than 
isomorphism by projecting the predominant institutional setup of MS in migration 
matters onto Ukraine. Despite the interorganisational impact of EU support as in the 
Moroccan case, the larger emphasis of politics over policies is central in the 
Ukrainian context. Since 2007, discussions about the institutional division of the 
migration portfolio have been hijacked and paralysed by struggles between 
Ukrainian Presidency and Government about the future power distribution in the 
semi-presidential system (Christensen et al., 2005, ICPS, 2008) .   26
 
These factors hamper EU intentions of a functioning asylum system in Ukraine. 
Effective protection is a pre-requisite for activating EU readmissions without violating 
migrants’ human rights. Chain-refoulement is furthermore likely due to close 
collaboration between security services of former Soviet republics which puts current 
asylum seekers and refugees at risk. Ukraine’s copying of the ‘safe-third country’-
clause from EU asylum legislation not only shows normative Europeanisation but 
conveniently serves as a backdoor for Russian-Ukrainian relations because Ukraine 
does not need to recognise refugees from Russia and simultaneously does not 
endanger bilateral relations (Interview IUNHCR3, Council of Europe, 2007: 39).  
6.0 Conclusion 
A macro-level analysis of EU relations with NMS misses the complexity of 
interorganisational dynamics which mark policy output in the area of migration policy. 
Policy output is shaped during the implementation process in what has been 
characterised as a policy-action relationship. This understanding sensitises against a 
simplified understanding of Europeanisation as a unidirectional top-down process. 
Quite the contrary, Europeanisation is a complex and ongoing process that is 
shaped by interorganisational dynamics within the governance network. A meso-
level analysis allows assessing the influence of a wider range of actors involved in 
policy implementation including actors from NMS, NGOs and international 
organisations. It has been argued that interorganisational dynamics are not solely 
attributable to functional-rationalist considerations within organisations. Also 
sociological and historical factors need to be taken into account to overcome a 
limited understanding of governance networks.  
•  Both pre-existing centralisation and fragmentation of the organisational field 
within the NMS can introduce turf-wars and incompatible belief systems into 
EU projects. 
•  Even in areas of central and exclusive sovereignty of states such as border 
management, cooperation can be achieved but is dependent on consent of 
central political actors.  
•  Effective implementation depends largely on ownership over projects by 
central stakeholders and adequate administrative capacities.   27
•  EU-funding provides opportunity structures that can reinforce existing belief 
systems and positions within governance networks and even undermine 
original policy intentions. 
•  EU-funding can introduce ideological tensions into an organisational field with 
direct repercussions for project implementation. 
 
Furthermore, some tentative comparisons can be drawn from the Moroccan and 
Ukrainian case:   
•  A privileged interlocutor MS can exacerbate the potential for success or 
frustration in the development of EU migration policy interventions in NMS. In 
the Moroccan-Spanish example this targeted EU interest at first punitive then 
collaboratively and finally allowed for widening of the EU policy agenda in 
form of the EU’s global approach. Although Ukraine is interested in widening 
the agenda, the lack of a privileged partner at EU level limits its voice to be 
heard.  
•  Cohesion in the executive and strength of administrative system can 
substantially shape or hamper EU cooperation even to the detriment of 
original EU objectives. In contrast, political infighting, weak executive power 
with constant repercussions on the administrative system and high levels of 
corruption limit influence on the EU policy agenda but largely affect EU 
interventions. 
 
All in all, direct EU influence is difficult to distil out of the opacity of 
interorganisational dynamics in a complex policy field like migration. EU funding 
provides and changes opportunity structures and provides impetus in some areas 
but does not determine policy outputs.   28
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